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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a survey of the literature on why risks may be
costly for firms, but also on why firms may find difficulty to insure them. A
wide variety of arguments are provided, at the intersection of the economic
theory of insurance, corporate finance, and decision theory.
1 Introduction
The possibility to share risk is a cornerstone of our modern economies. Be-
cause risk-sharing allows for risk-washing through diversification, it is useful
for risk-averse consumers. It is also essential for entrepreneurship. With-
out risk transfers, who could have borne alone the risk to build skyscrapers
and airplanes, to invest in R&D, or to drive a car? Historians have well
documented the role of private risk sharing devices in the development of
trade in the middle ages, in particular in the case of sea transport. The suc-
cesses of the Netherlands in the seventeenth century and of the England in
the eighteenth century are strongly correlated with the emergence of finan-
cial markets and insurance companies in those countries. The prohibition of
insurance companies in France during the same period is one of the explana-
tions for the late starting of the industrial revolution there.1 The importance
of risk-sharing has recently been restated when insurance markets have been
on the verge of collapsing after the events of September 11.
The standard economic model of risk exchanges predicts that competi-
tion on insurance markets leads to a Pareto-efficient allocation of risks in the
economy. In particular, it states that all diversifiable risks in the economy
will be washed away through mutual risk-sharing arrangements. All risks will
be pooled in financial and insurance markets. Moreover, the residual system-
atic risk in the economy will be borne by the agents who have a comparative
advantage in risk management, as insurers and investors. In short, it means
that all individual risks are insured. This prediction is obviously contradicted
by casual observations. Many diversifiable risks are still borne by individ-
uals. Indeed, individual consumption levels are not perfectly correlated in
the population, i.e., for every shock in the economy, they are ”winners” and
”losers”. This is the expression of an inefficient risk sharing ex ante.
The adverse consequences of the limits to insurability are overwhelmingly
underestimated. The management of risks and the management of produc-
tion cannot be disentangled. It forces small entrepreneurs to bear the risk
linked to their investment. Small business risks are usually not insured, and
new entrepreneurs are left alone with the riskiness of their projects. As a
consequence, many of their socially valuable projects are not implemented.
It yields a reduction in investment, employment and growth. Moreover, the
1See Bernstein (1997) and Baskin and Mirandi (1997) for a short description.
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failure of some of the implemented projects lead to dramatic individual sit-
uations for their residual claimants. Given risk aversion, it has a sizeable
adverse effect on ex ante welfare.
The absence of insurance covering various risks borne by firms does not
necessarily yield an inefficient allocation of risk in the economy. In particular,
shareholding companies may find it optimal to retain most of their business
risks in their balance sheet. To simplify the argument, consider a risk that
is independent of the macro risk in the economy. Then, a shareholder with
a well diversified portfolio would bear no additional risk by requiring that
this risk be retained by the firm. On the contrary, insuring the risk would
impose additional costs for the firm, because insurance usually yields a posi-
tive loading. This would reduce the profitability of the firm, with no benefit
for shareholders in terms of risk reduction of their portfolios. Thus, the puz-
zle for shareholding companies is quite opposite to the one that I described
above, and can be coined by the following question: Why do corporations
purchase costly insurance?
In this paper, we try to cover these two aspects of the question by dis-
cussing the determinants of the demand of insurance by firms. On one side,
we will examine the limit of insurability of some of the risks that should be
— but are not — covered by an insurance contract. On the other side, we
will provide arguments for why do some shareholding companies insure some
risks in spite of the ability of shareholders to wash them out more efficiently
through diversification in their portfolios.
We will first review the standard theory of risk-sharing. We will then
review the determinants of the demand for insurance by considering two
different categories. In section 3, we consider the determinants and their
limit that can be applied to any economic agents, not only firms. In section
4, we focus on the additional elements that are specific to firms.
2 The economics of diversifiable risk sharing
The standard economic model of risk exchanges has been introduced by
Arrow (1953), Borch (1962) and Wilson (1968)). Suppose that there are
S possible states of nature indexed by s = 1, ...S. There are n agents in
the economy. Agent i has a state-dependent wealth ωis in state s. To each
possible state of nature s, there exists an insurance market where agents can
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trade a standardized contract that would entitle its owner (the policyholder)
to get one monetary unit (the indemnity) from its counterpart (the insurer)
if and only if state s occurs. Let πs denote the price (the premium) of this
contract. We assume that economic agents trade in order to maximize the
expected utility of their final wealth. For example, agent i solves the following
maximization program:
max
d1,...,dS
SX
s=1
psui(ωis + ds) s.t.
SX
s=1
πsds = 0,
where ps is the probability of state s, ui(.) is the increasing and concave utility
function of agent i, and ds is his demand for the insurance contract specific
to state s. The budget constraint just states that agent i must finance his
purchase of insurance coverage in some states by selling insurance coverage
associated to other states. Observe that we assume that state probabilities
are common knowledge, that the realized state is observable by all parties,
and that there is no transaction costs. The above program has a solution
(di1, ..., d
i
S). When solved for all agents in the economy, this generates an
aggregate demand for the insurance contract associated to state s equaling
Ds =
P
i d
i
s that depends on the price vector (π1, ..., πS). A market-clearing
condition is thus that Ds = 0. Requiring that this condition holds in all
insurance markets s = 1, ..., S yields S conditions that allows to determine
the competitive price vector of insurance contracts. This in turn determine
the exchanges of risk at the competitive equilibrium. As is well-known, this
competitive allocation of risk is Pareto-efficient in the sense that there is no
other feasible allocation of risks that raises the expected utility of an agent
without reducing the expected utility of any other agents.
The competitive allocation of risk has many insightful properties. In
particular, all diversifiable risks in the economy will be washed away through
mutual risk-sharing arrangements. All risks will be pooled in financial and
insurance markets. Let zs =
P
i ω
i
s/n denote the mean wealth in the economy
in state s. Individual risks are diversifiable if zs = z for all s, that is, if the
mean wealth in the economy is risk free. In that situation, it is easy to
show that cis = ω
i
s + d
i
s will be independent of s for all i, which means that
agents will get full insurance in that economy. It implies more generally that
individual consumption levels cis depends upon the state only through the
mean wealth in that state: cis = c
i(zs)
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Moreover, the residual systematic risk in the economy will be borne by the
agents who have a comparative advantage in risk management, as insurers
and investors. In short, it means that all individual risks are insured by
insurance companies which transfer the aggregate risk to financial markets.
More specifically, the competitive equilibrium must be such that
dci(z)
dz
=
T i(ci(z))Pn
j=1 T j(cj(z))
,
where T i(c) = −u0i(c)/u00i (c) measures the degree of absolute risk tolerance
of agent i. This formula tells us that the share of the systematic risk borne
by agent i is proportional to his risk tolerance. Gollier (2001) gives a more
detailed description of the properties of efficient allocations of risk.
We can derive the following predictions from this model. First, economic
agents should be able to transfer 100% of their diversifiable risks to the
economy. This can be done either through insurance markets with actuarial
prices, or through other risk-sharing schemes, such as solidarity mechanism,
or as some alternative financial arrangements (equity financing, cost-plus
procurement contracts,...). Second, they should retain a fraction of risks
that are correlated with the aggregate risk of the economy (such as natural
catastrophes or various risks related to the business cycle). Third, share-
holding companies should be indifferent between transferring risk to their
shareholders or purchasing insurance contracts at competitive prices. The
predictions of the classical insurance model are obviously contradicted by
casual observations. The remainder of this paper is devoted to solving this
puzzle.
3 General explanations for uninsurability
In this section, we review the explanations for uninsurability that can be
applied to any risk, not only those borne by firms.
3.1 Transaction costs
Contrary to what we assumed above, providing insurance is a costly activ-
ity. The insurer must cover administrative costs linked to the monitoring of
individual insurance policies. It must control for ex ante and ex post moral
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hazard. That entails in particular expensive audits of large claims. In addi-
tion, insurers usually face the problem of adverse selection. They must invest
in costly efforts to screen their customers. It is commonly suggested that all
this yields a 30% loading factor for insurance pricing. In other words, insurers
must have a loss-to-premium ratio that does not exceed 0.7 in order to break
even on average.
When insurance is costly, the choice of the level of coverage is not a sim-
ple matter. Arrow (1963) and Mossin (1968) were the first to examine this
question in a simple static model. Mossin (1968) showed that it is never
optimal to purchase full insurance when insurance policies are not actuari-
ally priced. Consider an agent who purchased a full insurance contract and
who contemplates the possibility to switch to a policy yielding a small reten-
tion. The benefit of switching comes from the reduction of the deadweight
insurance cost. The cost of switching comes from the risk premium linked
to the retained risk. As seen in Figure 1, the risk premium increases from
zero as the square of the size of the retained risk. Thus, the marginal cost
of retaining a small share of the insurable risk is zero. In consequence, given
the positive marginal benefit of risk retention, no expected-utility-maximizer
consumer should purchase full insurance.
Arrow (1963), showed that the optimal form of risk retention is given by a
straight deductible. The optimality of a straight deductible is the expression
of the relevance of insurance for large risks. Small risks, i.e. risks whose
largest potential loss is less than the optimal deductible should not be insured.
Given the cost of insurance, risk-averse entrepreneurs should find it optimal
to self-insure the risk of a one-day business interruption, but they should
try to insure their main warehouse against fire. Dre`ze (1981) estimated the
optimal level of deductible in insurance. It is a decreasing function of risk
aversion. If we accept a range [1, 4] for relative risk aversion, Dre`ze concluded
that the optimal level of deductible should be somewhere between 6% and
23% of the wealth of the policyholder.
3.2 Adverse selection
In the classical model, it is assumed that all agents share the same informa-
tion about the likelihood of the various states. This allows for an hetero-
geneous population as long as the characteristics of the risk borne by each
agent is common knowledge. For example, the fact that some firms have a
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smaller rate of accidents is compatible with full disability insurance for all
firms at the competitive equilibrium with a risk-neutral insurance industry.
The premium rate for every category of risk will be fair, thereby inducing
each firm to purchase full employer disability insurance at the optimum.
A problem arises when the population of risks is heterogeneous, but the
observable characteristics of the agents are not perfectly correlated to the
intensity of their risk. The adverse selection problem initially pointed out
by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1986) originates from the observation that if
insurance companies calculate the premium rate on the basis of the average
probability distribution in the population, the less risky agents will purchase
less insurance than riskier agents. In the extreme case, the low-risk agent
will find the premium rate too large with respect to their actual probability
of loss. They will prefer not to insure their risk. Insurers will anticipate
this reaction, and they will increase the premium rate to break even only on
the population of high-risk policyholders. The presence of high-risk agents
generates a negative externality to lower-risk agents who are unable to find
an insurance premium at an acceptable premium rate.
There is no doubt that many business risks are firm-specific, and are thus
very heterogeneous. Insurers can gather information to reduce the asymmetry
of the information. They can use databases to infer the historic frequency
and intensity of losses, or they can send auditors to evaluate the quality of
safety procedures. But it is likely that this will not completely eliminate the
uncertainty about how to categorize firms in different risk classes. This yields
the adverse selection problem. Low risk firms will then prefer to self-insure,
which is inefficient.
The policy recommendation that is relevant to reduce adverse selection
is to make public all relevant information about corporate risks. Moreover,
insurance companies should be allowed to discriminate their customers ac-
cording to their perceived risks. Limiting their ability to discriminate would
generate an adverse selection problem even in the absence of any asymmet-
ric information. There is a European syndrome for forcing the insurance
sector to redistribute wealth among different categories of risk through the
prohibition of discrimination. This is particularly obvious for risks related to
human capital (unemployment, disability). This is also true for natural dis-
asters (uniform pricing in France), automobile, environmental risks,.... Our
claim is that the regulator has underestimated the cost generated by the
adverse selection problem that this policy induces.
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3.3 Ex ante moral hazard
In the previous section, we assumed that the riskiness of a firm is completely
exogenous. In fact, risks can be heterogeneous not only because agents bear
intrinsically different risks, but also because they do not invest the same
amount of their energy, wealth, or time to risk prevention. Again, this does
not raise any specific insurability problem in the absence of any asymmetric
information problem. Suppose indeed that insurers can observe the firms’
preventive efforts. The more virtuous firms will be safer, and insurers will give
them more favorable tariffs due to the competitive pressure. These insurance
bonuses will provide the good incentive for firms to invest in prevention, and
all firms will fully hedge their insurable risks. There is no insurability problem
in that case.
Suppose alternatively that insurers cannot observe the investment in risk
prevention by the insuree. In that case, the premium rate is not sensitive
to the effort made by the policyholder to prevent losses. Obviously, the ex-
istence of an insurance contract reduces the firms’ incentive to investment
in prevention. This is so-called ex ante moral hazard. The level of risk pre-
vention will be inefficient at equilibrium. Anticipating this low degree of
prevention and the higher frequency of losses that it entails, insurers will
raise their premium rate, as shown for example by Shavell (1979) and Holm-
strom (1979). Full insurance will not be optimal for agents. At the limit,
no insurance can be an equilibrium. The ex-ante moral hazard problem is
probably the most plausible explanation for why most risks associated to a
firm’s core business are not insurable. The uncertainty about future profits
cannot be insured because that would reduce too much the firm’s incentive
to maximize these profits.
The policy recommendation to fight against ex ante moral hazard is the
enforcement of norms for risk prevention. This is the case for environmental
risks in which ships transporting chemical products have to satisfy several
safety requirements that are imposed by regulatory agencies. Why are these
norms mostly organized by regulatory agencies rather than by insurers is not
completely clear. One reason is due to the combination of negative exter-
nalities and limited liability. If they are more than one principal supervising
the implementation of norms, the information among the different principals
should be pooled to save on monitoring costs.
Another policy recommendation is again to allow insurers to discriminate
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prices among different policyholders. Allowing for discrimination is a way
to provide incentive to policyholders to invest in risk-reducing activities.
In France again, insurers are not allowed to discriminate premium rate for
natural risks. The consequence are by now obvious: too many firms built
their warehouse in areas that were secularly known to be flooded periodically.
3.4 Ex post moral hazard
Ex post moral hazard relates to the risk of fraudulent claims. We assumed
in the classical model that the size of the loss was observable. There are
many instances in which this is at best a crude approximation of the real
world. Contracts can be made contingent only upon observable events. The
problem here is to give the good incentives to the policyholder to report
her actual loss. The inability for insurers to verify claims is at the origin
of why it is usually not possible to insure against the loss of easily movable
and tradable assets. It is also well known that warehouses are more likely to
burn during downturns of the economic activity, when the stored products
are more difficult to sell. Weisberg and Derrig (1991) and Dionne and Gagne´
(2000) measure the intensity of fraud in automobile insurance.
There exist other types of risk for which outcomes can be observed by the
insurer only at a relatively high auditing cost. Townsend (1979), Mookherjee
and Png (1989), Picard (1996) and others analyzed the optimal risk-sharing
scheme in this case. If there is no limit on the penalty that can be imposed
to policyholders that do not declare the actual level of their loss, the first-
best solution can be attained. Indeed, insurers should announce that they
will audit claims with some probability p. If the insuree made a fraudulent
claim, a +∞ penalty (”death penalty”) is imposed to him. This is enough
to give him the good incentive not to fraud on the insurance contract, even
if p is very small. In this case, the fact that there is costly claim verification
is not detrimental to welfare, and the risk is insurable in full.
But there are several reasons to believe that an infinite penalty in case
of a fraudulent claim is not a realistic assumption. There are ethical reasons
why an infinite penalty is not acceptable by Society. Also, there is limited
liability. Finally, insurers and third parties may often observe the size of the
loss only with an error when auditing. The risk of error could well induce
the insurer to punish a policyholder who reported his loss correctly. Ex ante,
it is then Pareto-efficient to limit the size of the penalty. In order to report
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her loss correctly, the insurer will have to audit claim at a high frequency.
This entails additional costs on the insurance contract. If the auditing cost is
high, or if the frequency of audit necessary to give the good incentive for the
policyholder to reveal the truth is too high, consumers would be better off by
not insuring the risk. Notice that another way to reduce the willingness to
submit a fraudulent claim is to limit the indemnity. The maximal indemnity
that is compatible with truth-telling is an increasing function of the penalty
and of the probability of audit. Insurees would like to announce ex ante that
they will not submit fraudulent claims ex post. That would allow insurers
to save the audit cost, thereby reducing the equilibrium premium rate, but
the announcement is not credible.
Is ex post moral hazard an important problem? It is often suggested that
the cost of fraudulent claims may well amount up to 10% of premiums paid
for some insurance lines as automobile insurance or homeowner insurance.
This estimation is just about paying unjustified indemnities to policyholders,
not the auditing cost to fight against fraud. This percentage is comparable to
the rate of transaction costs, whose effects on insurability has been previously
examined.
The policy recommendation is clear from the discussion above: one should
impose larger penalty to policyholders that have been convicted of a fraud-
ulent claim. Several countries in Europe have been weak in this area, recog-
nizing fraud as a ”national sport” that should be forgiven. By doing so, the
legal system imposes a large cost to Society in terms of a loss of insurability.
This weakness has been particularly clear for insurance lines where the in-
demnity payer does not have the good incentives to be though on fraud. For
example, one may question about whether European social security organi-
zations are fighting fraudulent claim efficiently. This yields a general distrust
to the system, which is detrimental to unemployed themselves. Also, suc-
cessive governments in France publicly ordered insurance companies to be
”generous” with their policyholders every time a natural disaster occurred.
The same effect is also apparent about agricultural mutuals, funded by the
taxpayers in France, to provide indemnities without audit. The capture of
the regulator in charge of indemnifying victims generates an important loss
of efficiency in the allocation of risks.
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3.5 Implicit risk-sharing versus insurance
A substitute for market insurance is to organize an implicit or explicit system
of solidarity for the unlucky economic agents through an indemnity financed
by the lucky ones. Social security is the most obvious example. The decision
of the US government to compensate the relatives of the victims of September
11 and the shareholders of airline companies is another example. France is the
prefect example of a country that established an implicit system of solidarity
for unlucky citizens. Farmers and truck drivers for example can rely on the
state to get compensations for adverse shocks to their profits. Victims of
floods may expect to get indemnities that depend upon the power of their
local representatives at the Parliament.
The solidarity system yields problems that are similar to those of the
market insurance: adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud. Moreover, if
the system is implicit, it generates some uncertainty about the level of the
indemnity, because of the political nature of the intervention. But the most
important difficulty is related to the non-stability of the coexistence of the
solidarity system and the insurance system. If some agents believe that the
state will compensate them for their damages, they will prefer not to insure
the risk. Ex-post, the massive absence of insurance coverage forces the state
to intervene. This is a case of self-fulfilling prophecy. One can mitigate this
problem by asking the state to specify explicitly the conditions and the limits
of national solidarity. However, such a commitment may be difficult. Ex-post,
the social pressure for the public indemnification of the uninsured victims of a
much publicized catastrophe will be strong. Solidarity kills market insurance.
This problem can also be mitigated by offering public indemnities that are
not contingent to the existence of an insurance contract covering the victim’s
loss.
3.6 Ambiguity
The possibility to transfer a risk to the market place is contingent upon
whether the buyer is ready to pay a larger price than the minimum price
at which the seller is ready to sell. Consequently, the concept of a limit to
insurability cannot be defined only on the basis of the distributional char-
acteristics of the risk, but it should also take into account the economic
environment. Berliner (1982) enumerates the criteria to define insurability.
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The actuarial view on this problem is usually summarized by stating that a
risk is insurable if the Law of Large Numbers may be applied. It means that
the maximum potential loss may not be infinite, or very large. Similarly,
the legal environment must be stable, or predictable. Finally, an objective
distribution function should be subject to quantification.
This definition is not entirely satisfactory. The actuarial view on the
limits of insurability appears to be too narrow. After all, the Lloyd’s agreed
to underwrite the risk of the capture of the monster of Loch Ness, and more
standard insurance companies cover the risk of failure of new rocket launchers
in spite of the absence of any relevant data on which an insurance tariff could
be based. There are indeed many instances in which the random variable
describing the risk has no objective probability distribution. This can be
due to the absence of historical data. Or because of our imperfect scientific
knowledge, for those who believe in a deterministic nature. To illustrate,
who knows the actual probability of, for example,
• a major leak in some specific type of nuclear plans,
• an epidemy of avian flu next year, killing more than 100 000 Europeans,
• a large terrorist attack on the Italian territory next year,
• or the average temperature on earth to increase by more than 4 degree
Celsius in the next century?
Ambiguous probabilities can also be due to a volatile environment, as is
the case for future liability rules of environmental policies.
The ambiguity about the probability distribution raises several questions.
How to calculate a fair insurance premium? How to evaluate the benefits of
an insurance contract for the insuree? What would be an efficient allocation
of risks in the economy? To keep it simple, suppose that there are two
possible states of nature, a loss state and a no-loss state. The probability
p of the loss state is unknown. Using all available information gives us an
interval of confidence [pmin, pmax], with a mean p. Following the terminology
of insurers, we are in a situation where there is no credible actuarial estimates
of the risk, which ”implies” that the risk cannot be priced, and that the risk
is not insurable.2 Let us try to understand this explanation of the limits
2The ambiguous probability cannot explain alone the uninsurability problem. Borch
(1989) reports the Lloyd’s insuring the risk of discovering the monster of Loch Ness.
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of insurability. Keynes (1921) distinguished between probabilities and the
weight of evidence. Probabilities represent the balance of evidence in favor
of a particular event, whereas the weight of evidence represents the quantity
of evidence supporting that balance. He then raised the following question:
”If two probabilities are equal in degree, ought we, in choosing our course of
action, to prefer that one which is based on a greater body of knowledge?”
The defenders of the orthodox theory claim that ambiguity is no prob-
lem. Following Savage (1954), people should behave as if there would be
no uncertainty on probabilities. More precisely, they should use p, i.e. the
best probability estimate, to compute their expected utility. Ambiguity on
probabilities should not play any role neither on welfare nor on behavior. In
particular, it should not affect the demand and supply of insurance. Whereas
this theory has a strong normative contain, it cannot explain various observa-
tions. Ellsberg (1961) showed in a well-known experiment that some people
do not behave as Savagian agents. They don’t behave in the same way in
the face of two uncertain environments with the same probabilities, but with
different weights of evidence. More precisely, they are ready to pay more
to get rid of a more ambiguous risk. In the Keynes-Ellsberg’s ”two-color”
problem, there are two urns each containing red and black balls. Urn 1
contains 50 red balls and 50 black balls, whereas urn 2 contains 100 red and
black balls in an unknown proportion. A ball is drawn at random from an
urn and one receives 100 euros or nothing depending on the color of the ball.
The fact that people are indifferent to bet on red or black if urn 2 is used
indicates that their subjective probability for each color is 0.5, as in urn 1.
If they would be SEU maximizers, they should thus be indifferent to using
urn 1 or urn 2 for gambling. However, most people prefer to gamble with the
unambiguous urn 1, where the ”weight of evidence” is larger.
The concept of ambiguity aversion has received a precise theoretical con-
tent by the works of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Ambiguity aversion
means that economic agents do use some probability p smaller than p to
measure their welfare in the face of uncertainty. Pessimism is another word
for ambiguity aversion. People may have different degrees of ambiguity aver-
sion, as they may have different degrees of risk aversion. Notice that if both
the policyholder and the insurer have the same degree of ambiguity aversion,
they should use the same p to compute expected utility on one side, and
the actuarial value of the policy on the other side. This should not intro-
duce any specific insurability problem. The ambiguity raises the premium
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required by the insurer to accept to cover the risk, but it also raises the policy-
holder’s willingness to pay for insurance. An insurability problem may occur
only if insurers are systematically more ambiguity-averse than consumers.
Kunreuther, Hogarth and Meszaros (1993) conducted a series of studies to
determine the degree of ambiguity aversion of insurers. They showed that
many of them may exhibit quite a large degree of such an aversion.3 For
which reasons this is the case remains an open question. This could for ex-
ample come from an incentive problem. Underwriters are usually much more
penalized when it happens ex-post that they ”underestimated” the risk of
loss than when they ”overestimated” it. Underestimation leads to the much
visible problem for the company to face a loss ratio much larger than unity
(asbestos in the US, transfused blood scandal in France,...). Overestimation
yields unearned potential profits that are usually not even mentioned by the
principal. Thus, underwriters would not be genetically more ambiguity-
averse. Rather, they react to biased incentives. Solving this uninsurability
problem requires a modification of incentive schemes for underwriters.
4 Insurability problems specific to entrepre-
neurial risks
In section 2, we explained that, when insurance transactions are costless,
corporations should be indifferent to hedge their risks though insurance mar-
kets, or to transfer them unmanaged to their shareholders. Whether these
risks are correlated to the macro risk or not is irrelevant for this conclusion a`
la Modigliani-Miller. This is because shareholders can undo what firms do in
terms of risk-spreading by a symmetric reallocation of their portfolios. This
is because they can diversify in their portfolios the non-systematic part of
the corporation’s insurable risks, whereas the shareholders of the insurance
company would require exactly the same risk premium to accept to insure the
systematic risk than the shareholders of the corporation. If we add trans-
action costs of insurance contracts into the picture, it becomes clear that
shareholding companies would reduce their market value by insuring their
3Viscusi and Chesson (1999), using a sample of 266 business owners facing risks from
climate change, show evidence of both ambiguity-seeking behavior and ambiguity-averse
behavior. More precisely, people seem to exhibit fears effect of ambiguity for small prob-
abilities of suffering a loss, and hope effects for large probabilities.
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risks. In this section, we review the literature on corporate finance that
explains why risk is costly to firms. This review provides additional char-
acteristics of the insurance demand specifically for firms that complements
what was presented in the previous section.
4.1 Taxes on corporate profits
Taxes on corporate earnings are usually not linear. In most countries, they
are convex, in the sense that larger corporate earnings usually encounter
larger marginal tax rates. As for individual income taxes, the first few hun-
dreds euros of corporate earnings are untaxed. This may be due either to
an explicit element in the tax code, or to the fact that some fixed expen-
ditures, as capital depreciation, are tax deductible. Eeckhoudt, Gollier and
Schlesinger (1997) examine the specific effect of the deductibility of past
uninsured corporate loss on the corporation’s risk attitude. The effect of all
these deductiblities is to enlarge the range of corporate earnings with a zero
marginal tax.
The convexity of the corporate tax scheme implies that the net-of-tax
corporate earnings is a concave function of the corporate gross earnings.
This implies that firms are averse to risks on gross earnings, even if these
risks can be diversified through their shareholders’ portfolios. The intuition
is easy to understand. Suppose that the firm does not pay any tax if its
earnings is below some threshold D, and that it pays a constant marginal
tax t if earnings exceed D. We depicted the concave relationship between
gross and net earnings of this firm in Figure 1. Suppose also that the firm
expects a gross earning Y which is larger than D, if no accident occurs.
Consider first an environment in which the firm faces a risk for which the
maximum possible loss is smaller than Y −D. In this situation, the firm and
the State share the risk proportionally, and are therefore neutral to it. That
is, they are unanimously indifferent to purchase insurance at actuarial price.
In particular, the firm gets full tax deductibility for the potential loss and for
the insurance premium, so that the corporate tax is neutral to the insurance
decision.
Suppose alternatively that the maximum loss exceeds Y −D. Here, the
risk-sharing arrangement introduces a conflict of interest between the two
risk bearers. From the point of view of the firm’s owners, the insurance
premium is fully tax deductible, but the potential losses are only partially
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Figure 1: The conflict of interest between the firm’s owner and the State
when some fixed expenditures are tax deductible.
tax deductible. In that situation, it is clear that purchasing an actuarially fair
insurance contract to cover potential losses reduce the expected tax payment
to the State. Insurance is thus strictly preferred by the firm in this case. Of
course, the interests of the State are strictly opposed to those of the firm in
this case.
One interesting testable hypothesis derived from this analysis is that firms
with a large reserve of losses to carry forward to future tax periods, i.e., a
large tax shield, should be more willing to purchase insurance.
4.2 Agency costs between creditors and owners
At this stage, it is useful to go into more details in describing the ”owner” of
the firm. Usually, a corporation financed its past investments by borrowing
money to creditors, and by sharing the property rights of the firm with
various investors. These shareholders are the residual claimants on the value
of the firms once creditors have been reimbursed. As long as the firm is not
bankrupt, which normally occurs when the value of the firm V is less than
the value of the debt D, the shareholders manage the firms. The right to
manage the firm is transferred to the creditors in case of bankruptcy. This
standard system of corporate governance has several well-known deficiencies.
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Figure 2: The conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors
In particular, there is an agency problem between creditors and shareholders
when the value of the firm is relatively close to the value of its debt, as
shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This agency problem originates from
a conflict of interest between creditors and shareholders which is similar to
the one described in the previous section between the firm’s owner and the
State. We draw in Figure 2 the payoffs of creditors and shareholders as a
function of the market value of the firm. For a value of the firm less than
the value of the debt, the firm is bankrupt, and the entire value goes to the
creditors. Otherwise, the creditors get the reimbursement of the debt, and
shareholders receive the value net of the debt.
Suppose first that the current market value of firm is much larger than
value of the debt, so that the risk of bankruptcy is null. In that situation,
the firm can finance its investment at a rate close to the risk free rate, and
shareholders have the right incentive to manage the firm’s risk. There is no
agency problem in this situation. Suppose alternatively that the value of
the firm is only marginally larger than the value of the debt. In that case,
shareholders benefit from the upside risk of the firm’s activity, but most of
the downside risk is borne by creditors, because of the limited liability of
shareholders. Limited liability gives the shareholders the equivalent of a free
call option. Put it in simpler terms, under limited liability, the owners of
an insolvent firm can only benefit from taking more risk, because they do
not bear the burden of losses. Therefore, if they are risk-neutral, they will
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seek to maximize the expectation of a convex function of his wealth. As a
result, they will systematically exhibit a risk-loving behavior, and adopt a
very risky attitude. This is a kind of moral hazard problem. Risk aversion
mitigates this result, but only for firms which are well capitalized, as shown
by Gollier, Koehl and Rochet (1996).
It has long been recognized that limited liability distorts the shareholders’
decision in a way that is socially inefficient. The US Saving and Loans crisis
is often explained by the fact that ”zombie” S. and Ls adopted in the late
eighties a very risky attitude in an attempt to ”bet for resurrection” after
some blows on their portfolio of (real estate) assets. The more recent scandals
of Enron and Parmalat also illustrate this point.
The effect of limited liability of the policyholder on his demand for insur-
ance is thus unambiguous: if he is risk-neutral, it is never optimal to cover a
risk of loss, even in the most favorable case where the premium rate is fair.
Insuring the risk would yield a sure reduction in wealth equaling the expected
loss. Not insuring the risk would yield an expected reduction of wealth that
is less than it, since the agent bears only part of the risk of loss. Another
way of looking at this problem is that the insurance contract create a ”deep
pocket” where victims can find compensation for their losses. This kind of
problem is particularly crucial when examining the demand of insurance by
firms for environmental risks. Limited liability on the part of the insurer also
reduces the demand of insurance, since it makes the indemnity dependent to
its solvency.
In the above analysis, we took the value of the debt as completely exoge-
nous. However, creditors can anticipate this agency problem. Knowing that
the owner of the firm will take too much risk, they will accept to borrow
to the firm only at premium. In the absence of any asymmetric informa-
tion on the firm’s risk management, this increased cost of capital will serve
as an efficient incentive for the firm’s owner to manage risk in an efficient
manner. The creditors play here a role that is very similar to an insurer,
by accepting to cover the downside risk of the firm against the payment of
an actuarially fair premium implictly included in the borrowing rate. The
problem with this story is that it may be hard for creditors to observe the
degree of riskiness of the firm’s business. The owner of the firm could promise
to implement safer investment projects and to hedge insurable risks to the
creditors to get a better borrowing rate. But it may be hard ex post for the
owner to resist a substitution of the safe investments by riskier once, and to
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reduce the insurance coverage of various insurable risks. One way to solve
this agency problem for creditors and the associated commitment problem
for the firm’s owner would be to bundle their credit contract with a set of
insurance contracts. Hedging removes the incentive of owners to substitute
safe activities by risky ones, and can provide a credible signal to creditors
that such expropriatory behavior will not be undertaken.
As explained by Doherty (2000), this agency problem also yields an un-
derinvestment problem. Consider a solvent firm which contemplate the pos-
sibility to invest in a risk free project that yields some cost today C and some
positive revenue Y next year. Suppose that it is socially efficient to imple-
ment the project because its net present value −C + Y/(1 + r) is positive.
Suppose now that the firm will remain solvent next year only with probabil-
ity p. Then, it is optimal for the owner to invest only if −C + pY/(1 + r) is
positive. So, it may be possible for a rational firm not to invest in a socially
efficient project because of the agency problem inherent to corporate gover-
nance. A better insurance coverage of the firm’s underlying risk may help to
solve this problem. Firms with a smaller growth opportunity have a larger p
and have thus the most to gain from hedging.
Notice that same story can be given in an insurance context. Consider a
”long-tail” risk whose potential losses would emerge only in a distant future,
as is the case for many environmental damages (asbestos). A premium can
be paid now in order to guarantee an indemnity in this distant future if a
loss occurs. Because bankruptcy may occur in between, the owner pay the
full cost of insurance, but he lay expect to get only a fraction of its benefit.
Thus, considering the dynamic aspect of this agency problem yields another
explanation of the low insurance demand by firms. A testable hypothesis
here is that the firm’s demand for long-tail risks is inversely related to the
time for damages to emerge.
4.3 Bankruptcy costs
Bankruptcy may be very costly for the stakeholders of a firm. It entails di-
rect costs, as accounting costs, legal fees and court fees. But it also entails
indirect costs associated with the transfer of management rights to alterna-
tive managers who are not necessarily in a position to maximize the residual
value of the firm, by lack of information and experience. In addition, these
liquidators don’t necessarily have the incentive to manage the insolvent firm
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in an adequate way. There is no general picture here, since the incentive
schemes implicit in bankruptcy laws are very diverse across countries. Fi-
nally, bankruptcy hurts the valuable reputation of the firm’s owners.
When a loss occurs that triggers bankruptcy, the total loss for these
stakeholders combines the actual loss plus the bankruptcy costs. Seen from
ex-ante, this provides an additional incentive form them to purchase insur-
ance. Hedging risk is a strategy to escape the costs associated to bankruptcy.
Notice however that this costs are borne ex-post by creditors, since shares
expire worthless when the firm becomes bankrupt. Thus, the existence of
bankruptcy costs on the creditors’ shoulders should not affect the preference
of the firm’s owners. However, the same point as in the previous section can
be made: Creditors of potentially insolvent firms anticipate that they will
bear the bankruptcy cost in case of insolvency. In the absence of an asym-
metric information problem, they will therefore pass these expected costs to
the owners through an increased interest rate on their credit. Thus, owners
will internalize the cost of bankruptcy in their risk management. We see here
again that there is an intimate relationship between the access to credit by
firms and their insurance decision. Committing to insure their business risks
is a way for firms to secure their access to credit markets, and to reduce their
cost of capital. However, the existence of asymmetric information problems
may limit the benefit of insurance. The possibility for creditors to have ac-
cess to information on the firm’s insurance decisions is a key element for the
elimination of these agency problems.
4.4 The pecking order hypothesis
An important tested hypothesis in corporate finance is the so-called pecking
order hypothesis, which states that firms have an implicit order of priority
for the sources of financing of their investment project. Internal funding is
the most preferred and the least costly source. Then comes external debt by
banks or by emitting bonds. The least preferred and the most costly source
of funding is external equity. External financing is more costly because of
the asymmetric information problems already mentioned before.
The pecking order hypothesis implies that firms face a convex cost func-
tion for capital investments. As long as no loss occurs, the firm may ex-
tract enough resources from its business to finance new investment at low
cost. But suppose alternatively that an uncovered loss occurs. This liquidity
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shock raises the marginal cost of capital. Some projects that were attractive
before the accident are not profitable anymore because of this. The decision
to invest in them may be either postponed or even cancelled. This reduces
the value of the firm. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) suggest that this
loss may be large: for every dollar of sudden capital loss, firms reduce their
investment budget by approximately 35 cents.
If the loss would have been covered by an insurance contract, the in-
demnity paid by the insurer would have preserved the internal funding of
projects. Given the convexity of the capital cost function, hedging risk is
a way to reduce the expected cost of capital. Insurance preserves internal
sources of funding, reduces the need to call more external sources, and secures
the investment in future profitable projects.
4.5 Agency costs between owners and managers
Contrary to what was assumed above, corporate decisions are usually not
made by the corporation’s owners, but rather by professional managers. This
immediately raises some new agency problems. The outcome of the manage-
ment is measured by the profitability of the firm, which is itself a function of
the manager’s talent and effort. The problem is that both talents and efforts
are difficult to observe by the firm’s owner. Higher efforts and better talents
will lead to higher profit. The problem is that exerting efforts is costly for
the manager, which raises a conflict of interest between the firm’s owner and
the firm’s manager. This implies that the owner must provide incentives for
the manager to exert effort. In the absence of risk, there is a one-to-one rela-
tionship between the manager’s effort and the firm’s profit. Thus, the effort
can be indirectly observed through the realized profit.4 The incentive scheme
is then to pay the manager according to profit. If the bonus for high-profit
managers exceeds their cost of effort, as may be the case with stock option
plans for example, the interests of managers and owners are convergent, and
the agency problems yields no inefficiency.
The problem with this story is that profits are affected by many other
factors which are random and usually hard to observe by the owners. Then,
it may be possible for an untalented and lazy manager to get a high profit
4We do not take into account of the possibility for the manager to falsify the firm’s
balance sheet.
20
by luck, or for a talented and active manager to end up with a low profit
because of purely adverse chance. This has two consequences. First, this
uncertainty may affect the risk-averse manager’s incentive to exert effort.5
Second, because managers are risk-averse, the uncertainty of their actual
compensation (value of their stock options) reduces their welfare ex-ante.
This will force owners to raise their expected manager’s bonus to compensate
for this risk. Insurance can alleviate this problem. It removes the noise
that prohibits the owner to observe the manager’s effort, and it serves as
an insurance for the risk-averse manager’s bonus. This allows the owner to
reduce the expected bonus paid to the manager, and it raises the efficiency
of the incentive scheme.
This story was a moral hazard tale. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) provides
an adverse selection tale for why firms may want to purchase insurance.
Suppose that there are good and bad managers on the market, and that
their quality is difficult to observe by owners. Because talents and profit
are positively correlated, managerial rewards indexed on the firm’s profit is
a good way for owners to self-select their managers. Good managers will
accept stock options, whereas bad managers will prefer a flat compensation
scheme, as in the Rothschild-Stiglitz tale on insurance markets. But this
signaling strategy is costly because of the risk aversion of the good managers
who are forced to bear risk to signal their quality. By purchasing insurance,
they do not only reduce their own compensation risk, but they also improve
the quality of the signal by removing the noise. Insuring the firm’s risk is a
much more efficient way for talented managers to reveal their quality than
the merit bonus system.
4.6 Incidental risk and core risk
Doherty (2000) mentions an additional argument explaining why corpora-
tions use to hedge risks that are not in their core business, i.e. incidental
risks. The usual source of economic profit in a competitive markets is the
comparative advantage that some firms have in the management of their
risky activities. An oil company may want to retain the risk associated to
the exploration of new oil fields, because that is where they have their core
5See Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) for a discussion of the effect of the uncertainty on
the optimal effort of a risk-averse manager.
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competence from which they extract their profit. However, in the process of
undertaking these core business risks, the firm is forced to bear other risks,
for which it has no comparative advantage to manage, as currency risks, lia-
bility risks, or safety risks for its employees. The firm cannot expect extra
profit from bearing these noncore risks. On the contrary, insurers and reinsur-
ers usually have a comparative advantage in managing them, and there is a
market for a mutually advantageous risk transfer between firms and insurers.
In short, insuring incidental risks reduces their cost.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown why risks may be costly for firms, but also why
firms may find difficulty to insure them. A wide variety of arguments have
been provided. Their heterogeneity suggests that these theory may be tested
by observing the actual insurance demand by firms.
Firms have an incentive to insure risks because they face a convex tax
scheme, which implies that hedging risk reduces the expected tax. Firm own-
ers may also want to insure risks because it serves as a credible signal that
they will not expropriate creditors by undertaking high-risk activities. Hedg-
ing risk is also good for reducing the likelihood of financial distress. This
will improve their access to the credit market. Also, insurance is a strat-
egy for firms to secure their access to cheap sources of funding their future
investment, by pre-financing the reconstruction costs, and by reducing the
intensity of liquidity shocks. The insurance of incidental risks is also useful
for owners to solve the agency problem that they face with their risk-averse
managers. It reduces the asymmetric information on both the manager’s
effort and the manager’s quality.
But the insurance of corporate risks is confronted to the same well-known
insurability problems than those of individual risks: transaction costs, ad-
verse selection, ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard, crowding-out by solidarity,
and ambiguous probabilities. The actual corporate decision to insure com-
bines all these aspects in various degrees depending upon the probabilistic
characteristics of the risks, the social, economic and legal environment of the
firm, and the structure of its governance.
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